





1. Introduction  
Emerging robustly in the 1990s as a global tour de force in the globalisation process, 
‘multinational corporations’ (MNCs), also referred to as ‘multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) or 
‘transnational corporations’ (TNCs) introduced complex international structures connected to 
states, but at the same time transcending national boundaries.1 According to Shaw, MNCs 
‘constitute private organisations comprising several legal entities linked together by parent 
corporations and are distinguished by size and multinational spread’.2 The operations of 
multinational corporations raise important questions of shared responsibility,3 because of the 
globalised nature of their operations and the impact of their activities. As Clapham correctly 
pointed out, a single actor by its action can generate multiple violations by a range of actors, 
thereby raising the question of shared responsibility and allocation of liability.4 In other words, 
an MNC through its global transactions with other actors may set in motion a chain of activities 
that may lead to multiple harmful outcomes and subsequent claims. The situation is further 
complicated by the structure of international law and the fact that at present there is no 
international tribunal or court that has jurisdiction over MNCs.5 It is argued in this chapter that 
despite the conceptual difficulties in applying shared responsibility to MNCs under 
international law, there are significant developments at the international level which may 
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facilitate allocation of shared responsibilities between MNCs and other entities implicated in a 
violation of international law. 
This chapter starts by contextualising the situations that may lead to shared responsibility 
between MNCs and other parties under international law (section 2). The chapter thereafter 
discusses the state of international law on the responsibility of states for the actions of MNCs 
(section 3). The chapter also examines situations that may lead to shared responsibility in the 
interaction between home states, host states and MNCs, especially in the context of investment 
treaties (section 4). The chapter further examines existing soft law rules on the international 
responsibility of MNCs and their potential implication (if any) for the concept of shared 
responsibility (section 5). Attention is paid to the United Nation’s Framework for Business and 
Human Rights (Framework) and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(Guiding Principles) developed by the former United Nations (UN) Special Representative for 
Human Rights and Business, John Ruggie, because of their currency and possible potential for 
the future. The chapter also discusses the relevant case law (section 6) and conceptual 
difficulties posed by the current structure of international law to shared responsibility of MNCs 
(section 7).  
 
2. Contextualising shared responsibility and MNCs 
It is pertinent to contextualise situations in which MNCs activities may implicate the concept 
of shared responsibility. A case in point is activities of MNCs in Nigeria. The typical structure 
of MNCs in the oil industry in the country is as follows: a parent company usually based in 
Europe or the United States (US), with subsidiaries incorporated as Nigerian corporations, 
engage in joint venture partnership with the Federal Government of Nigeria through the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC),6 typically in a ratio of 55-60 per cent to the 
government and 40-45 per cent to the corporation. The shareholders of the parent company are 
predominantly in the home countries.7 The MNCs usually maintain managerial control of the 
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enterprise. The government contributes proportionately to the cost of carrying out the oil 
operations and receives a share of the production in the same proportion. A key question arising 
from this scenario is as follows: in a situation where an MNC operates in partnership (e.g. joint 
venture) with the state owned corporation, and it is alleged that the MNCs, the state corporation, 
and the Nigerian government have caused injury to a plaintiff/claimant, can the state and the 
MNC be held jointly responsible and liable under international law? Assuming that this is 
possible, how is the responsibility/liability to be allocated? A related question is that where the 
operations of an MNC are done within the framework of an investment treaty, could there be a 
situation of shared responsibility arising from the investment framework? 
The following domestic and international judicial decisions illustrate some of the issues. The 
first case is Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria Ltd. and 
others.8 This case was instituted against Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd., 
the NNPC, and the Attorney General of the Federation of Nigeria. The multiple defendants 
therefore include a sovereign state, a state owned corporation, and a multinational corporation. 
The case was brought under the fundamental rights enforcement procedure in the Nigerian 
Constitution,9 alleging violations of both constitutional provisions and the African Charter.10 
The plaintiffs claimed that the oil exploration and production activities of Shell, which led to 
incessant gas flaring, had violated their right to life and the dignity of the human person under 
sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the Nigerian Constitution, and Articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African 
Charter. The plaintiffs alleged that the continuous gas flaring by the company had led to 
poisoning and pollution of the environment which exposed the community to the risk of 
premature death, respiratory illnesses, asthma and cancer. They also alleged that the pollution 
had affected their crop production, thereby adversely affecting their food security. They 
claimed that many of the natives had died and many more were suffering from various illnesses. 
It must be noted that the allegations were not only directed against the multinational 
corporations, but also against the Nigerian government as joint venture partner to Shell through 
the NNPC, and also for being complicit as regulators.  
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A similar approach was taken before the Community Court of Justice of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in The Registered Trustees of the Socio-
Economic Rights & Accountability Project (SERAP) v. President of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria and others.11 The other defendants are the Attorney-General of the Federation (as the 
Chief Law Officer of the Federation of Nigeria); the NNPC (as majority stakeholder in all joint 
ventures); and six subsidiaries of multinational corporations. The complaints that formed the 
basis of the proceedings were similar to the Jonah Gbemre case. The plaintiffs alleged failure 
and/or complicity and negligence of the defendants individually and/or collectively in causing 
injury to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also claimed compensation on an individual and/or 
collective basis. In making a case for the liabilities of the multiple parties, the claimant relied 
on international instruments including the African Charter and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).12 We shall return to these two cases at a later stage in this 
chapter. 
In the above examples, the Nigerian government would appear to be the marginal player in the 
events constituting the alleged violations. This is because the activities complained of were 
carried out by MNCs, and the government was implicated indirectly. However, there are cases 
in which the MNCs are the marginal players, while the state is the principal actor, because the 
alleged violations were carried out by the state. An example of such a situation is the recently 
settled South African Apartheid era case of In re South African Apartheid Litigation,13 where 
the plaintiffs brought an action before a US Federal Court against 20 banks and corporations 
for complicity, by encouraging and furthering abuses by the South African government against 
the black Africans. Similarly, in the well-known case Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Shell Corporation 
et al.,14 the allegations were that the defendant corporation acted in concert or complicity with 
the Nigerian government’s conduct which included torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and crimes against humanity. The two cases mentioned above were brought under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA or Act) and alleged a violation of international law under  
domestic laws of South Africa, Nigeria and the US.15 It is observed however that in these two 
                                                     
11 The Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights & Accountability Project (SERAP) v. President of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and others, ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, Judgment No. 
ECW/CCJ/APP/07/10, 10 December 2010 (SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria).  
12 See n. 10; and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, in force 23 
March 1976, 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
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14 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Shell Corporation et al., 226 F. 3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), 532 US 941 (2001). 
15 The Alien Tort Claims Act is also called Alien Tort Statute (28 USC, section 1350) (ACTA or Act). There is a 
vast literature on the ATCA case law. See for example: S. Coliver, J. Green and P. Hoffman, ‘Holding Human 
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cases, the states involved were not made parties because of the law on state immunity in the 
US (discussed in the next paragraph). 
Following on from the foregoing, it is pertinent to elaborate briefly on the controversial ATCA 
case law in the United States. This is because seemingly the Act allows cases alleging tort in 
‘violations of the law of nations’16 or international law to be brought before the federal courts 
in the US. It should be noted that the Act is procedural in nature, and the allocation of 
responsibility for violation of international law derives from national law. The most 
controversial aspect of the case law is the application of the law by the courts to MNCs for 
their conduct on a global scale. The cases that have been brought under the ATCA are usually 
based on the allegations that MNCs have been complicit with a state, or state actor, in the 
violation of international law; that MNCs aided and abetted foreign governments; or that they 
were joint actors with state entities. Such allegations potentially raise issues of shared 
responsibility under international law. However, an important and significant limitation on the 
ATCA process is the barring of proceedings against sovereign states in the US under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976.17 This effectively means that even though the 
allegations brought before the courts under the ATCA implicate states and MNCs, the state 
cannot be sued as a joint actor. The courts are thus confined to examining only allegations 
against MNCs under international law. It is worth noting that in 2013, the US Supreme Court 
significantly restricted the situations in which the ACTA can be used, potentially diminishing 
its importance.18 
The above examples have shown that MNC activities are increasingly raising questions of 
shared responsibility that an international tribunal or court may need to address in the future. 
The key questions are thus: first, where an MNC is one of multiple defendants, how does an 
adjudicator apportion responsibility and liability? (‘Liability’ here means the consequence 
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16 S9 Judiciary Act of 1989, now codified as 28 USC, section 1350.  
17 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 USC sections 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–11. 
18 Esther Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., et al., 621 F 3d 111 (S. C.t, 17 April 2013) (Kiobel). 
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arising from being found legally responsible for a violation.) Second, what will be the basis of 
liability? Third, what guidance is available to the adjudicator?  
 
3. State responsibility and multinational corporations 
At present, MNCs do not usually bear international obligations.19 This is because the 
predominant view is that states are primarily the subject of international law.20 This essentially 
means that states regulate corporations through national laws, on the basis of the international 
obligations of states. Generally, international law requires states to put in place laws that apply 
to corporations (including MNCs), and to enforce those laws.21 However, the general law of 
state responsibility makes it possible to attribute to the state the acts committed by private 
entities (including MNC’s) in violation of international law.22 A good starting point for the 
discussion in this section are the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC).23 This is 
because the instrument addresses the implication of the violation of international norms by 
private entities, such as MNCs, for state responsibility. It is observed that rather than 
establishing shared responsibility, the law on state responsibility attributes private entities’ 
violations of international law to states. Under Article 2 of the ARSIWA, state responsibility 
would arise where two elements are established: first, the existence of conduct consisting of an 
act or omission which is attributable to the state under international law; and second, that the 
conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state. These two elements are 
well established by international judicial decisions as principles of international law.24 
Therefore, in order for a state to be held responsible for a wrongful act of an MNC, the MNC 
                                                     
19 See generally C.M. Vazquez, ‘Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations under International Law’ (2005) 
43 CJTL 927; I. Bantekas, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law (2004) 22 BUILJ 309, 313. 
20 R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edn (London: Longman, 1996), 16–23. 
21 See Vazquez, ‘Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations’, n. 19.  
22 R. McCorquodale and P. Simons, ‘Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial 
Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 70(4) MLR 598, 606. 
23 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001/II(2) (ARSIWA); 
P.J. Kuijper and E. Paasivirta, ‘EU International Responsibility and its Attribution: From the Inside Looking Out’, 
in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), The International Responsibility of the European Union: European and 
International Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), 35. 
24 See Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 44 (1932), 4; S.S. ‘Wimbledon’ (United Kingdom and others v. Germany), 
PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 1 (1923); Greco-Bulgarian ‘Communities’, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 17 (1830), 32; 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, 174, 
at 180. See also Kuijper and Paasivirta, ‘EU International Responsibility and its Attribution’, n. 23, at 67. 
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conduct must breach positive international law in a manner that is attributable to the state, or 
the state must have violated one of its own obligations in relation to the regulation or 
supervision of MNC conduct.25 The attribution rule under Article 5 ARSIWA is important in 
the context of state responsibility and MNCs. The Article provides as follows: 
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is 
empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be 
considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that 
capacity in the particular instance. 
According to the ILC Commentary on the ARSIWA, the term ‘entity’ in the provision may 
include public corporations, semi-public entities, public agencies of various kinds and private 
companies, provided that they are empowered by national law to exercise elements of 
governmental authority.26 It has been suggested that governmental authority appears to include 
public functions such as ‘running prisons, health and education facilities’, exercise of delegated 
or quarantine powers by a private airline, and private corporations participating alongside the 
state in the identification of property for expropriation.27 In addition to the provision in Article 
5, Article 8 ARSIWA provides that: 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law 
if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control 
of, that State in carrying out the conduct. 
Under this Article, the conduct of private persons (natural or legal persons including MNCs) 
would be imputed to a state where private persons or legal entities are acting on the instructions 
of the state in carrying out a wrongful act, and where private persons or legal entities act under 
the state’s directions and control. 
A conclusion that can be reached from the preceding discussion on state responsibility and 
MNCs is that under international law, violations by non-state actors such as MNCs can be 
attributed to states. It is therefore plausible to argue that international law at least forbids states 
from allowing the infraction of its norms by MNCs and other private entities.28 
                                                     
25 J. Brunnee, ‘International Legal Accountability through the Lens of the Law of State Responsibility’ (2005) 36 
NYIL 21, 42. 
26 Commentary to the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 
2001/II(2) (ARSIWA Commentary), Commentary to Article 5, para. 2. 
27 McCorquodale and Simons, ‘Responsibility Beyond Borders’, n. 22, at 606. 
28 A. McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 250. 
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A relevant question in the context of this chapter, and more specifically in situations like the 
Nigeria scenario described above, is as follows. Assuming that it is established that an MNC’s 
conduct is in violation of international law, does the ownership by a state or involvement of a 
state in the ownership structure of a corporation simpliciter lead to, or should lead to, attribution 
of the MNCs conduct to the state? Stretching the question further, could this scenario 
potentially lead to shared responsibility between the MNC and the state? 
It is suggested that this depends on a number of factors including how the particular entity is 
constituted, its powers, and whether or not the entity is sufficiently distanced from municipal 
laws.29 For the purposes of this chapter, distinctions can be made between what Shaw called 
‘international public companies’ and other state owned enterprises (SOEs). International public 
companies are ‘characterised in general by an international agreement providing for co-
operation between government and private enterprises’.30 The way such entities are constituted 
varies widely, but may involve the application of more than one national law. Their powers 
also vary. Shaw gave the examples of ‘Intelsat’, ‘Eurofima’, and the ‘Bank for International 
Settlement’. Intelsat was established in 1973 as an intergovernmental consortium to manage 
global commercial telecommunication satellite systems. The company Eurofima was 
established in 1955 by a treaty of fourteen European states for the purpose of leasing rail 
equipment to rail systems of member states; and the Bank for International Settlement was 
created by treaty between six states. In Shaw’s view, if the international public company is 
sufficiently distanced from municipal law and is given a range of powers transcending 
municipal law, the entity may be regarded as having international personality.31  
While there is no authoritative definition of SOEs, the concept generally refers to legal entities 
that are created and/or controlled by governments for the purpose of participating in 
commercial activities. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) defines SOEs as ‘enterprises where the state has significant control, through full, 
majority, or significant minority ownership’.32 The position of international law on the question 
of the attribution of conduct of an SOE to states appears to be that the ownership interest of the 
                                                     
29 Shaw, International Law, n. 2, at 249. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005), at 11. 
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government does not automatically mean that the act of an SOE can be attributed to the state. 
According to Crawford, under the ARSIWA, 
[t]he fact that the State initially establishes a corporate entity, whether by special law or otherwise, is not 
a sufficient basis for the attribution to the State of the subsequent conduct of that entity. Since corporate 
entities, although owned by and in that sense subject to the control of the State, are considered to be 
separate, prima facie their conduct in carrying out their activities is not attributable to the State unless 
they are exercising elements of governmental authority within the meaning of article 5.33 
Therefore, under the current position of international law on state responsibility, the ownership 
of a corporation by the government is not crucial to determining state responsibility for the 
conduct of a state owned corporation. However, what is not clear and has not been addressed 
under the ARSIWA, is whether government involvement should trigger shared responsibility 
between the corporation and the SOEs, if a violation by the SOE is established. Pentikäinen 
has suggested that the prevailing state of affairs appears to enable states to use the SOEs to 
escape for instance international human rights obligations.34 
 
4. Shared responsibility between home state, host state, and a multinational corporation 
The term ‘home state’ generally refers ‘to the State from which an enterprise’s operations are 
directed’ while the term ‘host states’ refers to ‘all States where an enterprise operates other 
than its home State’.35 Host states have the jurisdiction to put in place standards to govern the 
operations of corporations operating within their territory, whether domestic or MNCs. Home 
states rarely exercise jurisdiction over their corporations’ operations abroad. There are 
exceptions, such as in the case of competition or anti-trust laws and export control laws.36 The 
exception exists because public international law allows each state a level of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, including the regulation of the conduct of corporations.37 This is based on 
established customary international law principles including the nationality principle (derived 
from the territorial principle, and applicable where activities taking place abroad have an 
                                                     
33 J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction Text and 
Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 112. 
34 M. Pentikäinen, ‘Changing International “Subjectivity” and Rights and Obligations under International Law – 
Status of Corporations’ (2012) 8(1) ULR 145, at 146, 148. 
35 McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights, n. 28, at 248. 
36 J. Zerk, Multinational and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 107. 
37 Ibid., at 133. 
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adverse effect within the regulating state); the effects doctrine (regulating activities that 
produce prohibited effect in the regulating state); and to a lesser extent, the universality 
principle.38 The idea of extraterritorial jurisdiction has led to the controversial question whether 
home states have an obligation to regulate MNC operations abroad. While some scholars have 
argued in favour of such a position,39 the law is not settled on this question.40  
The relevant question here is whether a situation of shared responsibility can arise between 
home states, host states and MNCs. There are no cases in which such an issue has arisen as at 
yet, but the question is whether or not the jurisdiction of states to regulate or facilitate the 
operations of an MNC can potentially lead to the allocation of responsibility between two or 
more parties. An example of a potential area where this could arise is in the contemporary 
practice of implementing social accountability in international investment agreements (IIAs), 
such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs). IIAs are agreements between home and host states. 
However, the direct beneficiaries, which are usually MNCs, are not party to the agreements, 
but they can enforce the provisions of the agreement through arbitration. Of particular 
relevance to this chapter is the emerging tendency to condition key benefits of the agreement 
upon social issues.41 One can imagine a scenario where the host state and home state of MNC 
X enter into a BIT that conditioned the operations of MNC X to conformity with certain social 
and environmental issues, for example maintaining a certain higher standard of containing oil 
spillage. Assume that MNC X failed to meet these conditions, and this has led to damages and 
financial loss for the host state (in containing the damage or paying compensations to victims). 
Furthermore, assume that the home state has a financial stake in the MNC X and it is also 
supportive of the mode of its operations. The question that arises in this scenario is whether or 
not the host state may be able to claim against MNC X and the home state in a joint proceeding 
before an arbitral panel under the BIT. Generally, the answer to this question is that there is no 
reason why such a claim cannot be made. In theory, an arbitral panel would be entitled to assess 
the involvement of the home state in the MNC and its possible contribution to the damages. 
The consequence of this scenario is that the home state and the MNC would contribute to any 
                                                     
38 McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights, n. 28, at 282. 
39 See for example S. Deva, ‘Acting Extraterritorially to Tame Multinational Corporations for Human Rights 
Violations: Who should Bell the Cat’ (2004) 5 MJIL 37, 50–51. 
40 Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (International Bar Association, 2009), 6.  
41 M.E. Footer, ‘BITs and Pieces: Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation of Foreign Investments’ 
(2009-2010) 18(1) MSJIL 34. 
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award of damages. This scenario presents a classic case of shared responsibility between an 
MNC and a state. 
Another example are conditions in a BIT that require the fulfilment of development related 
objectives, such as development of employment opportunities for the local population. Assume 
that the provision is operable; failure to fulfil such an objective may result in the host state 
withdrawing benefits of the agreement with adverse consequences for the investor.42 In such a 
situation, assume that the host state and home state wrongfully interpreted or applied the 
condition, and the interpretation or application has led to the loss of the preferential treatment, 
theoretically the MNC should be able to proceed against the two states for a remedy, and an 
arbitral panel should be able to allocate responsibility between the host and home state based 
on the agreement. Conversely, the host state should be able to enforce the operable condition 
against the MNC and its home state before an arbitral panel.  
 
5. Informal/soft law rules on the international responsibility of MNCs and their (shared) 
responsibility 
Because of the inability to hold MNCs directly responsible under international law, attention 
has been turned to soft law instruments to address the responsibility of MNCs at the 
international level. Given that some of the principles contained in these instruments have the 
potential of developing into hard law in the future,43 it is relevant to examine any implications 
they may have for the concept of shared responsibility. The key relevant instruments are the 
International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy;44 the United Nation’s Global Compact;45 the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises;46 and the United Nation’s Framework for 
Business and Human Rights (Framework) and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
                                                     
42 Zerk, Multinational and Corporate Social Responsibility, n. 36, at 281. 
43 H.M. Morais, ‘The Quest for International Standards, Global Governance vs. Sovereignty’ (2001-2002) 50 KLR 
779, 781; B.H. Oxman, ‘The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted International Standards’ (1991) 24 NYUJILP 
109, 119.  
44 Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, (1977) 17 ILM 422. 
45 United Nations’ Global Compact, see www.unglobalcompact.org/. 
46 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011) (OECD Guidelines). 
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Rights (Guiding Principles).47 These instruments are regarded as the ‘international standard on 
CSR [corporate social responsibility]’ by the European Union.48 
Perhaps the most relevant and arguably the most significant of these instruments to date are the 
Framework and Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. These instruments identify 
global standards of expected behaviour for MNCs which exists independently of states’ human 
rights obligations. The standards are designed to go beyond what is prescribed by domestic 
laws. It is plausible to assert that the Framework and the Guiding Principles have created non-
binding obligations on MNCs, independent of states’ obligations.49  
The overarching idea behind the Framework and the Guiding Principles is the notion that 
MNCs should share human rights responsibilities with states.50 This notion is in contrast to the 
traditional view that places these responsibilities solely on states. The possibility of shared 
responsibility in this context thus has two dimensions. The first is in respect of the multiple 
states in which MNCs operate (home and host states), and their responsibility to prevent and 
remedy human rights violations by MNCs. The second is in relation to the shared responsibility 
of one or more states and MNCs to respect and remedy human rights violations. The 
Framework’s purpose is to clarify the roles and responsibilities of governments and companies 
in relation to the human right impact of business activities. 
The Framework emphasises the shared nature of the responsibilities of the actors by declaring 
that it ‘rests on differentiated but complementary responsibilities’.51 These complementary 
responsibilities are encapsulated in its three core principles: first, the state duty to protect 
against human rights abuses by third parties, including businesses; second, a separate and 
independent corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and third, the need for the 
                                                     
47 ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
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provision of effective access to (judicial and non-judicial) remedies.52 The principles are 
complimentary in the sense that they are designed to support each other.  
On the part of states, it recognises the settled position in international law that the state has a 
duty to protect human rights and prevent abuses by private entities, including MNCs. It is 
notable that in spite of this duty, abuse of human rights by MNCs remains a problematic issue 
in several states.53 This situation underscores the need to revisit the responsibility framework 
under international law. The Framework pinpoints certain innovative approaches which may 
be relevant to the achievement of the state’s duty to protect. The first is that governments should 
foster a corporate culture which embeds respecting rights as an integral part of business 
operations.54 This can be achieved through sustainability reporting, redefining fiduciary duties 
of company officers, and strengthening the use of shareholder proposals at the annual general 
meetings of companies.55 It is also significant to note that states are required to examine the 
organisational corporate culture in determining potential corporate criminal liability.   The 
implication of this is that rather than focusing on individual acts of officers or employees for 
the purpose of determining corporate criminal liability, the focus is on company policies, rules 
and practices. The second approach is for (host and home) states and companies to jointly 
coordinate to develop better means of achieving a balanced outcome between all parties in the 
context of international investment and dispute resolution.56  
On the part of corporations, the Framework seeks to advance the responsibility recognised in 
key international soft law instruments – i.e. the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises – that MNCs have the duty to obey domestic laws and respect the principles 
recognised in the instruments. According to the Framework (except in situations where 
companies perform a public function or where they have voluntarily undertaken additional 
responsibility), the duty to respect means that companies ‘should act with due diligence to 
avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are 
involved’.57 What is also significant is the notion that the scope of the responsibility here is not 
just about complying with legal obligations, but ‘is defined by social expectations – as part of 
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what is sometimes called a company’s licence to operate’.58 The Framework prescribes that 
MNC responsibility can be achieved by due diligence. It is notable that the concept of due 
diligence was originally established and applied to state responsibility to protect human 
rights.59 The principle is also found in legal tools used by states to shape the behaviour of 
corporations.60 The Framework has thus adapted the concept in defining the responsibility of 
MNCs. According to the Framework, the substantive content of due diligence obligations is 
contained in the international bill of human rights and the ILO core conventions.61 These are 
instruments that are traditionally addressed to states.  
The third principle provides that states and companies have the responsibility to provide 
remedies, legal and non-legal, to victims of corporate abuse or misconduct. On the part of the 
states, the responsibility is to provide effective judicial mechanisms both in host and home 
countries. States should also facilitate credible and effective non-judicial mechanisms, such as 
the established national human rights institutions system and the National Contact Points under 
the OECD framework. On the part of companies, the Framework suggests that providing an 
effective grievance mechanism is part of the corporate responsibility to respect. The 
mechanism initiated by a company may be provided directly by the company, or it may use 
external resources such as expert mediators. For effectiveness and credibility, the mechanism 
is required to comply with the minimum requirements laid down in the Framework.62 The 
mechanism may be a joint effort of several companies, but the design and oversight should 
involve representatives of groups who may seek to use the mechanism. 
The Framework has not provided guidance directly as to how to allocate or distribute 
responsibility in cases where host states, home states and MNCs are alleged to have jointly 
contributed to an outcome in violation of international law. However, a practical implication 
of the Framework may be that it has delineated a principled basis for corporate responsibility 
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in the human rights sphere.63 The responsibility is rooted in the obligation to respect human 
rights and to provide remediation where it may be required. The provision of remediation is in 
addition to states’ provisions. The Framework has moved the discourse from a position where 
MNCs have no direct responsibility for preventing or remediating human rights abuse to a 
position where they share responsibility with states on these issues, albeit voluntarily. The 
overarching implication of this is that as a legal matter, there is allocation of responsibility, but 
only states are obliged to act.  
The Framework and the Guiding Principles are already showing positive influence on the 
corporate responsibility discourse at the international level. An important example of its 
influence is the way it has advanced the work of the OECD on the responsibility of MNCs.64 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines or Guidelines) 
recognise the responsibility of MNCs in an aspirational way alongside the state. The Guidelines 
recognise the importance of MNCs in the global investment process and the complexities of 
MNC cross border activities. They therefore attempts to identify the responsibilities of MNCs, 
and home and host states in the investment process. The Guidelines are in the form of 
recommendations from adhering states. These recommendations are addressed to MNCs 
operating in or from adhering states’ territories, and they provide guidance on the standard of 
behaviour expected from MNCs in their global operations. It is notable that while the 
Guidelines impose no binding obligation on the part of MNCs, there is a binding commitment 
on the part of adhering states to implement these recommendations. In describing its approach, 
the Guidelines provide: 
The Guidelines clarify the shared expectations for business conduct of the governments adhering to them 
and provide a point of reference for enterprises and for other stakeholders. Thus, the Guidelines both 
complement and reinforce private efforts to define and implement responsible business conduct.65 
Even though, the language used was ‘shared expectations for business conduct’, it is notable 
that a significant number of these expectations are derived from international law and went 
beyond compliance with domestic law, similar to the United Nations’ Framework. However, 
                                                     
63 According to Ruggie, the United Nations’ Framework has provided ‘a common global platform of normative 
standards and authoritative policy guidance for states, businesses and civil society’. See Ruggie, Just Business: 
Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, n. 1, at xxii. 
64 P. Muchlinski, ‘The 2011 Revision of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Human Rights, 
Supply Chains and “Due Diligence” Standard for Responsible Business’, A41D Series on Responsible Business, 
November 2011, 3; OECD Guidelines, n. 46, at 7.  
65 See OECD Guidelines, ibid., at 3. 
16 
 
MNCs are enjoined to honour the principles to the fullest extent, but in a way that does not 
violate domestic laws.66 
The recently updated version of the Guidelines was put in place to, among other things, 
introduce a new chapter on human rights consistent with the Framework.67 MNCs are required 
to provide or co-operate in the provision of remedy for adverse human rights impact, where 
they have caused or contributed to such outcomes. The responsibility of MNCs under the 
Guidelines is to ‘avoid causing or contributing to adverse impacts on matters covered by the 
Guidelines, through their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur’.68 
Furthermore, the Guidelines provide that in situations where the MNC has not directly 
contributed or caused an adverse impact, but the impact is linked to the MNC’s operations, 
products or services from a business relationship, the company should use its position or 
influence, acting by itself or in co-operation with other entities, to prevent or mitigate the 
adverse impact.69 
The Guidelines therefore enjoin MNCs to share certain responsibility with states which are 
traditionally the remit of states. Similar to the United Nation’s Framework, in identifying the 
responsibilities of MNCs in relation to human rights matters, the Guidelines make reference to 
important international instruments which are traditionally addressed to states. These include 
the international bill of human rights (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the ICCPR; 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),70 and the 
fundamental rights and principles set out in the ILO’S Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work.71 The Guidelines also require corporations to carry out human rights due 
diligence as a means of fulfilling their obligations.72  
 
6. Relevant case law 
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The impact of the Ruggie process has already featured in the adjudication before an 
international court. In the case of The Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights & 
Accountability Project (SERAP) v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and others,73 
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice considered whether it had jurisdiction to hold the 
Nigerian state, its state owned corporation, the NNPC, alongside six subsidiaries of MNCs, 
accountable for human rights violations in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The case arose 
from the adverse human rights, social and environmental impact of MNCs operations. In that 
case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants ‘individually and/or collectively’ inter alia 
violated international law. References were made to the ICCPR, ICESCR, and the African 
Charter. The remedy sought included an order compelling the defendants ‘individually and/or 
collectively’ to pay adequate compensation of USD 1 billion to the victims, and other forms of 
reparation the Court may deem fit.74 The plaintiff thus invited the Court to hold the multiple 
defendants jointly or severally responsible, and in consequence of such finding allocate liability 
to the multiple defendants. 
However, at the preliminary stage of the case, one of the key issues that the Court had to 
consider was whether it had jurisdiction to pronounce on the responsibility and liability of the 
defendant corporations for alleged human rights violations alongside that of the state. It was 
argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that: 
Multinational corporations like the Third Defendant have obligations under international law not to be 
complicit in human rights violations. Multinational corporations must not perform any wrongful act that 
would cause human rights harms; must be aware of their role not to provide assistance or any support 
that would contribute to human rights violations; and must not knowingly and substantially assist in the 
violation of human rights.75 
It was further argued that the violations of human rights by the corporations arose from a lack 
of due diligence and proper planning, and also from a failure to observe the minimum 
requirement to respect human rights.76 To support this contention, the plaintiff counsel referred 
to the United Nations’ Framework, and especially in relation to the concept of due diligence as 
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a mechanism for discharging the responsibility to respect human rights. The plaintiff’s counsel 
quoted with approval the following passage from the Framework: 
To discharge the responsibility to respect requires due diligence. This concept describes the steps a 
company must take to become aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts.77 
The Court acknowledged the fact that the accountability of corporations, and especially for 
violations of human rights or complicity in human rights abuses, is one of the most 
controversial issues in international law.78 The Court further acknowledged the widely held 
international concern on the apparent inability to hold MNCs accountable under international 
law.79 Commenting on the United Nations’ Framework, the Court observed: 
This need to make corporations internationally answerable has led to some initiatives, namely the 
nomination of Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations whose Report titled 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (The Ruggie Report) is 
one of the greatest reference on the accountability of multinationals for Human Rights violation in the 
world.80 
However, the Court concluded that despite these developments, ‘the process of codification of 
international law has not yet arrived at a point that allows the claim against corporations to be 
brought before International Courts’.81 One curious point from the ruling was the decision to 
exclude the NNPC from the jurisdiction of the Court, which is a state owned corporation and 
constituted by national law. It is posited that if the Court had called in aid Article 8 of the 
ARSIWA, it should have assumed jurisdiction on the NNPC in order to determine whether or 
not the corporation was acting on the instruction of, or under the direction or control of the 
state. Such an approach would have enabled the Court to explore whether or not the corporation 
should share responsibility with the Nigerian state for the alleged violations. It is pertinent to 
note that in the judgement of the ECOWAS Court on the substantive suit, the Nigerian state 
was found liable for its failure to enforce legislation, and to have regulation in force that could 
have prevented the violations that were the subject matter of the case.82 
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On balance, this decision underscores the future potential of the United Nations’ Framework. 
The plaintiff sought to employ the Framework in making a case for international human rights 
obligations of MNCs. In particular, the plaintiff emphasised the duty of MNCs to respect 
human rights which should be discharged through the practice of due diligence.83 The Court 
recognised the significance of this development, but concluded that the Framework has not 
(yet) created a binding international obligation.84 
The decision of the ECOWAS Court of Justice can be contrasted with the approach of the 
Nigerian Federal High Court in the Jonah Gbemre case.85 The multiple defendants were 
similar, a sovereign state, a state owned corporation, and the subsidiary of a multinational 
corporation. The alleged violations of human rights included violations of provisions of the 
African Charter. The defendants had contested inter alia that the African Charter, a regional 
instrument, did not create enforceable rights under the Nigerian fundamental rights 
enforcement procedure. There was no disputation as to the jurisdiction of the Court over the 
corporations, because the Court is a domestic court and corporations (domestic or foreign) are 
subject to the jurisdiction of domestic courts. The Court however disagreed with the contention 
that the African Charter did not create enforceable rights. It applied the provision of the African 
Charter and held that certain rights of the plaintiffs had been violated by the defendant’s 
collective action. It made orders which were directed against the MNC and the state, without 
having to address the issue of joint or shared responsibility. This was because the claim itself 
was for declaration and an injunction, which may not necessarily require having to allocate 
responsibility. The Court consequently restrained the subsidiary of the MNC from further 
flaring gas in the plaintiff’s community, and ordered specific steps that the state should take to 
prevent future violations.  
 
7. Conclusion  
The rapid growth and expansion, both in size and influence, of MNCs continues to increase 
their significance as global actors. The consequence of this development for international law 
is that the activities of MNCs increasingly impact on rights and duties at the international level. 
There is a consensus that corporations possess rights under international law (for example 
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under international investment law and human rights law).86 Nevertheless, the question of the 
obligations/duties of MNCs under international law continues to revolve around the 
theoretically complex, but related, questions as to whether MNCs are subjects of international 
law, and whether MNCs have international legal personality and international legal capacity.87 
However, as correctly pointed out in Oppenheim’s International Law ‘[i]t is a matter for inquiry 
in each case whether – and if so, what – rights, powers and duties in international law are 
conferred on any particular body’.88  
It is notable that the subjects of international law, and the entities having international legal 
personality, have expanded over the years. It has expanded to include non-state actors, such as 
intergovernmental organisations and individuals. Still, MNCs are not currently regarded as 
primary subjects of international law, and neither are they considered as having an international 
legal personality. As far as international law experts such as the late Antonio Cassese are 
concerned, corporations are merely secondary subjects of international law.89 Thus while 
individuals, states and intergovernmental organisations can potentially be held responsible and 
liable under international law, MNCs cannot. In recent times, there are suggestions that private 
and public corporations ‘may to a limited extent, be directly subject to rights and duties under 
international law’.90 Nonetheless, this notion is not clearly supported as at yet by practice. 
MNCs regulation has remained largely confined to the domestic forums. 
It is worth mentioning that with regard to recognising and imposing binding and enforceable 
legal obligations on MNCs before an international court, practice can be found in the 
negotiations of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).91 Some states, especially 
France, argued for vesting the ICC with jurisdiction to entertain cases involving legal entities, 
including MNCs, and presented a proposal to this effect.92 This proposal fell through because 
it failed to garner sufficient support. Part of the reasons for the failure was the fact that some 
states do not provide for corporate criminal liability in their domestic law. Therefore, 
introducing such a concept at the international level was problematic for such states. However, 
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potentially, the United Nations’ Framework may have paved the way for internationalising a 
theoretical basis for international corporate criminal liability through its concept of corporate 
culture, discussed earlier. A widespread use of the concept may provide an acceptable 
principled basis for international criminal liability. This development may make it easier in 
future attempts to expand the jurisdiction of the ICC to corporations. The growing consensus 
that corporations may have direct responsibility under international law for violations of 
international crimes such as torture, slavery, genocide and crimes against humanity is also 
worth noting. It has been observed that the absence of an international mechanism for enforcing 
such rights does not preclude the emergence of direct responsibility.93 
The consequence of the failure to make MNCs subjects of international law or confer on them 
an international personality, is that it has made it difficult to establish duties and obligations in 
a formal sense for MNCs at the international level. This makes it extremely difficult to talk of 
shared responsibility for MNCs at the international level. As the ECOWAS decision 
demonstrates, even though a plausible case of shared responsibility has been made against an 
MNC, the structure of international law allows the MNC to escape trial for its (potential) shared 
responsibility. It may therefore be instructive to follow Clapham’s suggestion that the use of 
the concept ‘subjects of international law’ is unhelpful and often useless on the balance.94 He 
suggested focusing on the rights and obligations of corporations, rather than theoretical debates 
on the subjects of international law and international legal personality. This would appear to 
be the approach that the Framework has taken. 
Undoubtedly, MNCs expanding activities at the global level has made it possible for them to 
contribute (as one of multiple entities) to a single harmful outcome in violation of international 
law. This essentially means that MNCs are capable of creating, or participate in the creation 
of, situations that involve allocation of responsibility on a shared basis. This raises the question 
of how to distribute or allocate responsibility between MNCs and other entities, especially 
states. It has been shown in this chapter that providing answers to this question is made difficult 
by the current structure of international law with regard to MNCs, and also because there is no 
international court or tribunal with jurisdiction over MNCs. Furthermore, the identification of 
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international responsibility of MNCs has proved difficult. The consequence of this state of 
affairs is that MNCs have largely succeeded in avoiding responsibility at the international level. 
However, there are developments at the international level which may have a bearing on this 
discourse in the future. These include the practice of implementing social accountability in the 
international investment framework, and the creation and implementation of soft law standards. 
These developments are in their early stages, but as the chapter has shown, may potentially 
have implications for the concept of shared responsibility in the future. 
